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abstract
I discuss the perspectival nature of  temporality in discourse and argue 
that the human concept of  time can no more be dissociated from the 
perspectival thought than the concept of  the self  can. The corollary of  
this observation is that perspectival temporality can no more be excluded 
from the semantic representation than the notion of  the self  can: neither 
can be reduced to the bare referent for the purpose of  semantic 
representation if  the latter is to retain cognitive plausibility. I present 
such a semantic qua conceptual approach to temporal reference developed 
within my theory of  Default Semantics. I build upon my theory of  time 
as epistemic modality according to which, on the level of  conceptual qua 
semantic building blocks, temporality reduces to degrees of  detachment 
from the certainty of the here  and the now. I also address the questions 
of  temporal asymmetry between the past and the future, and the relation 
between metaphysical time (timeM), psychological time (timeE, where 
‘E’ marks the domain of  epistemological enquiry), and time in natural 
language (timeL), concluding that the perspective-infused timeE and 
timeL are compatible with timeM of  mathematical models of  spacetime: 
all are definable through possibility and perspectivity.
keywords :  timeM, timeE, timeL, epistemic modality, Default Semantics, 
A-theory of  time, B-theory of  time, Perspective, Indexicals, Direct-
Quantitative View, Modal-Contextualist View.
“Sometimes I feel that life is passing me by, not slowly either, but with 
ropes of  steam and spark-spattered wheels and a hoarse roar of  power or 
terror. It’s passing, yet I’m the one who is doing all the moving. I’m not the 
station, I’m not the stop: I’m the train. I’m the train.”
Martin Amis, Money, 1984, p. 112.
[1]  Research leading to this paper was partially supported by The Leverhulme Trust grant 
Expressing the Self: Cultural Diversity and Cognitive Universals (Grant ID/Ref: RPG-
2014-017) <http://www.mml.cam.ac.uk/expressing-the-self>. I owe thanks to the Editors 
of  this Special Issue and to an anonymous referee for their comments.
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1.  Introduction:  the essence of  temporality
The human experience of  time relies on many contributing factors. To name 
a few, it is shaped by the structure and operations of  the human brain upon 
which our conceptualization of  reality is conditional; by the socio-cultural 
environment that makes us partition time in a certain way and adopt one or 
another perspective on the passing of  time; by the awareness of  the finiteness 
of  the human life; and, arguably, it is also reliant, at least on the level of  
communicated thoughts, upon the language in which we obtain and convey 
information. There is an endless list of  pertinent questions we can pose 
concerning the nature of  the human concept of  time, as well as the nature of  
time itself. In what follows I will focus on a small subset of  these, centred 
round what I want to call here the essence, or the core, of  the human concept 
of  time as it is represented in natural-language discourse. In particular, I will 
explore the relation between objectivity and perspective-taking, in that humans, 
in conveying information, while striving for objectivity, cannot avoid adopting 
a perspective. The latter is what indexicality in language allows us to do; 
in ascribing temporal reference, we adopt a perspective. The consequence of  
this is that the human concept of  time can no more be dissociated from the 
perspectival thought than the concept of  the self  can. The corollary of  this 
observation is that perspectival temporality can no more be excluded from 
the semantic representation than the notion of  the self  can: neither can be 
reduced to the bare referent for the purpose of  semantic representation if  the 
latter is to retain cognitive plausibility. In what follows, I will present such a 
semantic qua conceptual approach to temporal reference developed within 
my theory of  Default Semantics (Jaszczolt 2005, 2010, 2016a) – a radical 
contextualist approach that allows for an unconstrained independence of  the 
semantic representation from the logical form of the uttered sentence whenever 
the goal of  representing the primary meaning intended by the speaker and 
recovered by the addressee calls for it. In doing so, I build upon my theory of  
time as epistemic modality developed in Jaszczolt (2009a, 2013, 2016b), 
according to which, on the level of  conceptual qua semantic building blocks, 
temporality disappears: instead, there are degrees of  detachment from the 
certainty of  the here  and the now into which the concept of  time is 
reducible. In other words, temporality is a complex concept that can be 
broken down into simple, primitive, atomic concepts, and these are modal in 
nature. They are also scalar, pertaining to degrees of  epistemic modality. 
I also address the question of  temporal asymmetry between the past and the 
future that my scalar account throws up, and move on to the next seminal 
question of  this paper, namely the relation between metaphysical time (called 
here timeM), psychological time (timeE, where ‘E’ marks the domain of  
epistemological enquiry), and time in natural language (timeL), concluding 
that the perspective-infused timeE and timeL are compatible with timeM of  
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[2]  See my earlier comment that Default Semantics represents primary meanings, or primary 
speech acts, irrespective of  their relation to the structure (logical form) or the uttered sen-
tence. Since these acts are very often indirect, then so is the relation between the logical 
form and the semantic/conceptual representation. An example of  a representation is given 
in Section 4.3.
mathematical models of  spacetime: all are definable through possibility and 
perspectivity.
The structure of  my investigation is as follows. First, in the remainder 
of  this section, I introduce two vintage approaches to metaphysical time, the 
so-called A- and B-theories which, although both somewhat flawed, have 
given rise to the vast majority of  the current vivid debates in the philosophy 
of  time, and which have informed semantic approaches to temporal reference. 
Having adopted a complex stance that uses essentially B-theoretic devices 
appropriate for timeM but yields conceptual representations where A-theoretic 
time emerges by appealing to the perspective of  the speaker (timeE), I then 
move in Section 2 to some examples of  cross-linguistic differences in how 
temporal reference is expressed in natural languages, pointing out that these 
differences can easily be accounted for by what I call lex ic on/grammar/
pragmatics  trade-offs. I take on board the significance of  tenseless 
languages, as well as the phenomenon of  time–tense mismatches and the 
associated problems with accounts based on grammatical tense.
Throughout this paper, ‘tense’ is used in three ways: in the sense of  a 
predicate pertaining to grammatical categories (linguistic tense, or ‘tenseL’); 
in the sense in which it is used in metaphysics when philosophers talk 
about ‘tensed reality’ (metaphysical tense, or ‘tenseM’; see, e.g., Ludlow, 
1999, 2013, and McTaggart, 1908, on A-theory); and, finally for the concept 
of  time as the past, the present, and the future that does not necessarily 
correspond to the linguistic tense and that I call epistemic tense, or tenseE. 
TenseE is introduced here in order to capture the multifarious provenance of  
information about temporal reference of  eventualities that is then represented 
in conceptual qua semantic, but not necessarily qua structural-linguistic, 
representations.2 The concept tense will only be relevant when I consider the 
question as to whether reality, thought, and language are themselves tensed; 
that is, affected by the distinctions between the past, the present, and the 
future (leaving aside the question of  their reality). When I discuss time on 
the level of  metaphysical time, psychological time, and time in language 
(in its lexicon, grammar, as well as pragmatics), I use the analogous distinction 
between timeM, timeE, and timeL. The indices will also sometimes be applied 
to the labels ‘past’, ‘present’, and ‘future’, in an analogous way.
Next, in Section 3, I move to the subjectivity imposed by the speaker’s 
perspective and to the role of context in providing the perspective that, in radical 
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cases, can lead to the conclusion that even the past can change. In Section 4, 
I briefly present the theory of  temporality as epistemic modality developed 
within Default Semantics (Section 4.1), also attending to the question of  the 
asymmetry of  the past and the future that is seemingly irreconcilable with a 
degree-based modal account (Section 4.2), followed by a representation of  
an example of  a tense–time mismatch in Default Semantics (Section 4.3). 
In Section 5, I move to addressing the question of  how deeply rooted the 
modality of  time is and what it suggests about the compatibility between the 
L, E, and M levels. In other words, I consider the meaning of  modality vis-
à-vis the timeL/timeE/timeM distinction. Section 6 concludes with a general 
discussion of  the inalienable essence of  time on the dimensions of  experience 
and representation. I conclude that basic epistemic modal concepts together with 
the de se perspective allow us to represent reality as if  it was tensedM, but only so 
because timeM of spacetime models is itself intrinsically metaphysically modal.
Most current debates concerning the metaphysics of  time stem from the 
argument for unreality of  time proposed over a century ago by McTaggart 
(1908). He put forward two views on time, found them both flawed, and 
concluded as a result that time is unreal. According to the first view, called by 
him the ‘A-theory’, time passing is real: reality is tensedM, there is change 
in the world. In metaphysics, the stance that time passing is real, called 
tens i sm, is an umbrella term for four views, differentiated by what parts of  
the temporal spectrum are considered real: (i) the past, the present, and the 
future; (ii) only the past and the present; (iii) only the present and the future, 
in the sense that only these two have the property of  existence; and finally, 
probably the most popular stance in this camp, (iv) only the present exists – 
the view called presentism. According to the alternative view, ‘B-theory’, 
reality is tenselessM, and timeM does not flow. Events are real and are ordered 
according to the earlier than / later than relation, but there is no pastM, 
presentM, or futureM as their real attributes. Now, using the A-series we are 
able to represent change, but the series itself  is flawed in that temporality in 
it is irreducible, which leads to circularity: on the one hand, an event cannot 
be simultaneously past, present, and future, and on the other, when one 
removes the qualifier ‘simultaneously’, one presupposes the existence of  time 
and introduces circularity. Next, using the B-series we are able to represent 
the ordering of  events, but the series is flawed in that in order to make use of  
the earlier-than / later-than relations in the first place, we have to presuppose 
the existence of  time. Without time we would have just a timeless ordering on 
a meaningless scale which McTaggart calls the ‘C-series’. McTaggart therefore 
concludes that the past, the present, and the future are properties not of  reality 
but rather of  human experience. Humans remember events, perceive them, 
or anticipate them, which produces the experience of  time and of  the passage 
of  time. But this also leads him to conclude that time itself  is unreal.
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Nevertheless, there is a clear sense that time is real: events that took place 
cannot be ‘undone’; they belong to collective memory and to historical accounts 
irrespective of  the experience of  one particular individual; memories may 
differ somewhat or may fade completely, but there is some ‘reality’ beyond 
them that is composed of  what (with some approximation) various groups, 
societies, and nations choose to call historical facts. In a different way, time 
also appears to be real for scientists working with spacetime models and for 
those laymen for whom spacetime with the associated corollaries predicted by 
mathematical models constitutes a concept actively employed in reasoning. Basic 
understanding of  the ideas underlying Einstein’s theory of  relativity results in 
the belief – or knowledge, depending on the degree of understanding – that time 
is not absolute and that it varies with the velocity of  the moving object. Here 
B-theory comes up trumps. But there is a conceptually opposing force in human 
folk thought, founded on an accepted conviction that events can be placed on a 
pretty much fixed timeline, and characterized as past, present, or future, as they 
are in A-theory. The latter reflects the classical Aristotelian conception of time, 
adopted in Isaac Newton’s Principia Mathematica: time can be represented as a 
horizontal line extending infinitely in both directions, into the past and into the 
future. But just as the simplicity of  the picture is appealing, so the evidence, 
collected even at that time, was disturbing. It was observed that the time of the 
eclipses of the moons of Jupiter appeared, when observed from the Earth, to be 
related to the distance of  the moon. Henri Poincaré’s and subsequently Albert 
Einstein’s view that time is not absolute follow as a natural consequence. What 
we have now is the special and the general theory of  relativity that can still feel 
at odds with intuitions.3
Versions of  A-theory fare better with intuitions but encounter problems 
with truth-makers, especially for the temporal location that is denied existence: 
presentism, for example, has a problem with truth-makers for the past and 
the future and has to resolve to theoretical tricks which have dubious 
metaphysical support.4 They also appear to be incompatible with Einstein’s 
special relativity. For example, special relativity extends to relativity of  
simultaneity, while presentism is founded on the ontology of  times with 
[3]  Followers of  B-theory include Reichenbach (1948), Mellor (1998), Mozersky (2001, 
2015), and Le Poidevin (2007), among many others. It is also the foundation of  the rep-
resentation of  temporal reference in Discourse Representation Theory (Kamp & Reyle, 
1993) and most other formal representations of  time in language. A-theory can be traced 
to St Augustine and more recently has been represented by, e.g., Prior (e.g., 1967, 1968, 
2003), Smith (1993), and Ludlow (1999, 2013).
[4]  See, e.g., Baron (2015) on tensed truth-maker principles; see Dummett (2006) on justifi-
cationism and the symmetry of  the future and the past, but also Dummett (2004) on the 
reality of  the past, where he concludes that only those past events are true that have present 
truth-makers in the form of memories or other records.
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unique properties arranged on a scale (see Einstein, 1920/2010, and, e.g., 
White, 2015).5 On the other hand, the human experience of  time as tenseE 
can be dissociated from the properties of  real time when we accept that the 
flow of  time is an illusion caused by the experience of  living in time where 
events can be experienced as happening now and can be linked by causation. 
In other words, time can still be real but not flow (Mellor, 1998). This is the 
view compatible with the multidimensional view on spacetime in mathematical 
models of  contemporary physics. In the terminology adopted here, we would 
have tenseE but no tenseM: reality has timeM as some of  its multiple dimensions 
but does not have pastness, the now, or the future. It is the de se perspective 
that allows us to think of  timeM as if  it was tenseM. In Section 3 we will link 
this stance with perspective-taking and with expressing time as an aspect of  
expressing the self, using evidence from a domain that is not normally used 
for this purpose: the lexicon/grammar/pragmatics trade-offs in discourse as 
they are reflected in a variety of  natural languages.
2.  Temporal  reference:  from timeL to t imeE
The ways languages express temporal reference point clearly in the direction of  
some form of tenseE but away from universal tenseL and also away from tenseM. 
They also reveal the existence of  tense–time mismatches. In other words,
 
 (i)  languages have no difficulty with expressing the human concepts of  
the past, the present, and the future (tenseE);
 (ii)  not all natural languages have grammatical tense (tenseL); when they 
do, tenseL need not correlate with tenseE.
 
We will add to this the following:
 
 (iii)  (iii.a) the perspectival and egocentric representation of  temporal 
distinctions, as well as (iii.b) the epistemic-modal building blocks of  
temporal concepts that (iii.c) in themselves exhibit perspectivity strongly 
suggest that the property ‘tensed’ emerges on the level of  human 
conceptualization rather than being traceable to ontology (tenseM).
 
[5]  Einstein’s thought experiment aims at explaining the relativity of  time to the frame of  
reference. Imagine a train travelling with certain velocity along an embankment. Two 
flashes of  lightning that appear simultaneous to an observer on the embankment will not 
appear simultaneous to an observer on the train who moves towards one of  the sources 
of  lightning. In general,
“Events which are simultaneous with reference to the embankment are not simultaneous 
with respect to the train, and vice versa (relativity of  simultaneity). Every reference-body 
(co-ordinate system) has its own particular time; unless we are told the reference-body to 
which the statement of  time refers, there is no meaning in a statement of  the time of  an 
event.” (Einstein, 1920/2010, p. 26)
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In this section I will attend to (i) and (ii), leaving (iii.a) for Section 3, (iii.b) for 
Section 4, and (iii.c) for Section 5, which will complete the argument.
Although grammatical tense (tenseL) by its very raison d’être externalizes 
the concept of  temporal reference, the distinctions within this category can 
be more, or less, finely grained. Matses, a Panoan language of  the Amazon 
region, has three past tenses: recent, distant, and remote. When the sentence 
concerns a past eventuality reported on the basis of  inferential evidence, the 
source of  information has to be overtly specified using its evidential system. 
It has to be stated overtly, by means of  inflection called d ouble  tense 
(Fleck, 2007), (i) how long ago the eventuality took place and (ii) how long 
ago the speaker obtained this evidence, which results in categories such as 
‘distant past inferential’ plus ‘recent past experiential’, or ‘distant past 
experiential’ plus ‘recent past inferential’, adding up to nine markers for the 
past-time reference (see also Aikhenvald, 2012, p. 181). Central Pomo, a native 
American language spoken in California, distinguishes between two kinds of  
future: realis and irrealis, used in accordance with the speaker’s judgement 
about the degree of  probability of  the eventuality. Next, while we may think 
that realis/irrealis is a distinction subsidiary to the temporal one, Caddo, 
another native American language, expresses the future as realis (de Haan, 
2006, pp. 41–42). St’àt’imcets (Lillooet Salish) spoken in British Columbia 
has only the future/non-future distinction. However, since the marker of  
futurity kehl can also be used for the future in the past, akin to the English 
will/would, arguably the language is not inherently tenseless: the marker 
can be theoretically analyzed as combining with a phonologically empty, 
or unarticulated, tense morpheme (Matthewson, 2006). Present- and past-
time reference are expressed by potentially ambiguous temporally unmarked 
constructions where the aspectual class triggers the default reading: present 
for states and past for accomplishments and activities. Arguably, some overtly 
tenseless languages yield better to a tensed semantics with a null TENSE 
morpheme, while others, like Paraguayan Guaraní (Tupí-Guaraní), are 
‘inherently’ tenseless: analyzing them using TENSE would not work (see 
Tonhauser, 2011). In Tupí-Guaraní, future-time reference is expressed by 
using aspectual, modal, and mood markers such as desiderative/hortative, 
prospective, or possibility. Generally, in Tupí-Guaraní and Arawak languages, 
aspect, modality, and mood are expressed (optionally) through inflections 
on the verb, while temporal distinctions are expressed through the lexicon 
(see Aikhenvald, 2012, p. 180). To compare, Yucatec Maya makes use 
neither of  tenses nor of  temporal adverbials: temporality has to be gleaned 
from the aspectual marking through a default pragmatic interpretation 
(see Bohnemeyer, 2002). Languages with optional tense and aspect, such 
as Thai (see Srioutai, 2006), often make use of  the same strategy, with no 
loss of  informativeness or clarity.
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Considered from an extra-theoretic perspective, this means that, although 
a language may not have grammatical tenses, the way temporality is realized 
can still be closer to, or further from, the meaning of  the devices present 
in the system of  the language itself: sometimes the lexicon provides the 
necessary adverbials of  temporal location, which means that we can still 
glean regularities from the system itself, while at other times resorting to 
context used in pragmatic inference or in conversational defaults6 is the only 
way of  analyzing temporal reference. While we cannot yet at this point 
address the question of  universality or relativity of  the human concept of  
time (timeE) and the concepts of  temporal reference (tenseE), we are able to 
use this extensive evidence to argue in favour of  the equivalence between 
grammatical, lexical, and pragmatic means of  expressing these concepts, 
as well as their interaction – a process that I call elsewhere the grammar/
lexicon/pragmatics trade-offs (Jaszczolt, 2012). In this vein, Bittner (2005), 
for example, analyzes West Greenlandic (Kalaallisut), an Eskimo-Aleut 
tenseless language, emphasizing the precision with which temporality can 
be expressed in it. Tense–time mismatches in English, where, for example, 
the continuous or simple present can be used for future eventualities to 
signal their planned or predetermined status (‘futurate progressive’ and 
‘tenseless future’, respectively), or for the past to enhance the interest value 
of  narration (‘past of  narration’), demonstrate how the trade-offs can work: a 
temporal adverbial and the context, sometimes in conspiracy with the aspectual 
class, combine with information that is associated with the grammatical category 
to yield the exact required effect.7,8
Next, in addition to the differences in the granularity of  the distinctions 
within the past, present, and future categories, ranging from null to several 
temporal subclasses, there are orthogonal concepts: consecutive tense in Swahili, 
for example, is orthogonal to the past/present/future distinction; there is a 
grammatical marker signalling the ‘and then’ relation (Givón, 2005, p. 154). 
There is also the issue of  the orientation of  the speaker vis-à-vis the arrow 
of  time that is amply discussed in the cognitive semantic literature. Maori, 
for example, points to the conceptualization where the speaker faces the 
past: the past is known and as such is spread in front of  the speaker’s eyes 
[6]  By conversational defaults I mean here default interpretations as they are defined in Default 
Semantics: automatic, effortlessly arrived at interpretations assumed for the context by a 
Model Speaker and retrieved by a Model Addressee. ‘Default’ on this construal does not 
mean context-free meaning but an automatic interpretation in a given context.
[7]  For semantic analyses of  tense–time mismatches see, e.g., Jaszczolt (2009a) and Section 4.3 
below.
[8]  The ‘conspiracy’ with the aspectual classes is an important topic in its own right that 
deserves a separate in-depth analysis. It will not be pursued in detail in the current 
investigation.
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(Thornton, 1987). To repeat, we are not yet in a position at this stage in our 
argument to draw conclusions concerning the relative or universal status of  
temporal concepts: this question will have to wait until Section 4. However, 
what we can conclude is that, since it is fairly incontrovertible to assume a 
correlation between concepts and linguistic expressions, different aspects 
of  temporality are brought to salience in different natural languages, and it 
would take much more than our lexicon/grammar/pragmatics trade-offs to 
explain them because languages differ not only with respect to which of  the 
three kinds of  devices they employ for expressing a concept, but also with 
respect to what their speakers choose to conceptualize. There is much more 
to timeL than tenseL, but when timeL is construed in this contextualist way it 
maps onto timeE. It remains to be seen what this construal tells us about the 
question of  the relevant conceptual universals. The route we will follow here 
goes through the question of  the interaction between expressing temporality 
and the de se perspective, followed by the question of  the complexity of  
temporal concepts as reflected in natural language lexicons and grammars. 
The methodology of  this move is as follows. The assumed trade-offs allow us 
to go beyond tenseL; it is an investigation of  timeL that will allow us to enquire 
about the complexity of timeE and the associated tenseE (in the sense of pastE, 
presentE, and futureE). But instead of  assuming that timeE gives us an insight 
into timeM, as it is done in the so-called descriptive metaphysics,9 we will reverse 
the order of  explanation, ask whether timeM plays a part in the construal of  
timeE, and enquire about the foundations for their compatibility.
3.  Time,  perspective,  and expressing the self
Theories of  psychological time invariably draw on experience and on the 
understanding of experience. For Kant, Husserl, or Heidegger, time is founded 
on retaining images. Husserl (1928) distinguishes the apparent  t ime 
pertaining to external objects and the internal  t ime  pertaining to mental 
acts. Cognition is permeated with the properties of  mental states that at best 
(but not always, depending on the version of  intentionality adopted in a 
particular phenomenological approach) are directed at an external object, 
so it is the internal time that we ought to focus on: time comes into being as 
part of  consciousness. It is imposed on our experiences and only through 
them indirectly on real eventualities. External time only matters insofar as 
it is reflected in experiences (for the present), memories (for the past), and 
anticipations (for the future). The present, the past, and the future of  the 
external time are reanalyzed in this way as properties of  consciousness: 
[9]  Strawson (1959) and below Sections 4.2 and 5.
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primal impression (from perception of  the present moment), retention (from 
memory of  the past), and protention (from the expectation of  the future).10
Now, since internal time is constituted by consciousness, it follows 
that understanding time is part of  understanding the ego. Just as human 
life is bounded by the events of  one’s birth and death, so is the human 
concept of  time (see Heidegger, 1953); just as human life is composed of  
experiences perceived, remembered, and anticipated, so is the human 
concept of  time composed of  the present, the past, and the future. As was 
exemplified in the previous section, some of  these concepts in this three-
way distinction make it into the grammar and/or the lexicon of  natural 
languages – others do not, but as conceptual correlates of  experiences they 
are always salient.
In this picture, the three-way distinction in the domain of  temporal 
reference into pastE, presentE, and futureE acquires the status of  a conceptual 
universal. By theoretical assumption, for us, it will also acquire the status 
of  a semantic universal, irrespective of  what the syntax and the lexicon of  
the particular language choose to externalize, in that on our contextualist 
construal semantic representations capture the meanings conveyed in 
discourse irrespective of  their relation to the logical form of  the sentence, 
in agreement with the lexicon/grammar/pragmatics trade-offs.11
At this level of  generality, the three-way distinction making up tenseE 
exhibits obvious parallelism with that of  tenseM: we need not assume a flow 
of  time, or the present, the past, or the future on the level of  tenseM in order 
to uphold it. In metaphysical spacetime, in the second law of  thermodynamics 
the ‘arrow of  time’ points in one direction where the entropy (disorder) of  a 
closed system always increases in the world and what has happened, happened 
irreversibly. Likewise, in cosmological explanations of  time, the universe is 
progressively expanding (see, e.g., Hawking, 1988, p. 144), and analogously, 
in psychological time, the future always becomes the present and the present 
always becomes the past.
But when we enquire into the linguistic representations of  past-, present-, 
and future-time reference actually performed by interlocutors in discourse, 
even in one particular language, we can see considerable variety of  
conceptualization and a considerable degree of  choice. Combining temporal, 
modal (including evidential),12 and aspectual resources allows the speakers to 
represent eventualities with a different degree of  inherent detail and with a 
[10]  See also Kelly (2005).
[11]  See Sections 4.1 and 4.3 on Default Semantics.
[12]  I adopt the view that evidentiality is a category within epistemic modality. See Jaszczolt 
(2009a, p. 39), after van der Auwera and Plungian (1998).
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different degree of  commitment. For example, past events can be reported in 
English using regular past tense, as in (1):
 
 (1)  He went to London and met the Mayor;
 
past of  narration, as in (2):
 
 (2)  This is what happened yesterday: He goes to London and meets the 
Mayor;
 
epistemic necessity past, as in (3):
 
 (3)  He is not here; he must have gone to London to meet the Mayor;
 
or epistemic possibility past, as in (4):
 
 (4)  I wonder why he is not here; he may have gone to London to meet 
the Mayor.
 
The present and the future also allow for considerable variation – free 
variation with respect to temporal reference but often more constrained, 
principled variation from the point of  view of  epistemic commitment and 
considerations to do with informativeness, social and cultural appropriateness, 
and so forth. For example, focusing on the internal structure of  the event, 
one could represent it as protracted; focusing on evidence, one could use 
the evidential conditional. These are well-known facts of  the grammar and 
pragmatics of  English and we will not rehearse them here. What is of  interest 
to us is the fact that this availability of  a relatively free choice suggests that 
reporting on events is permeated with the de se perspective: just as in tenseE 
time is only of  interest where it translates into the properties of  human 
experiences, so in tenseL time is intertwined with perspective, including 
commitment, and the level of  detail with which the eventuality is presented. 
Further variation can be ascribed to the perception of  causal links between 
events and to what is conceptualized as a unique event in the first place. The 
literature on the individuation of  events is vast and philosophical discussions 
are ample. Suffice to say here that the question of  the granularity of  events 
applies not merely to units that correspond to propositional thought but at a 
higher level as well: William James’ spec ious  present, for example, is a 
concept constructed in order to capture the intuition that we are in direct 
contact not only with what is happening now, but also with what immediately 
preceded and will immediately follow the now; in other words, the intuition 
is that we directly perceive not only the present, but also chunks of  the past 
and the future, and they all form one experiential unit.
Bringing together perspective, the self, and the properties of  temporal 
reference appears indispensable when we attend to questions pursued in the 
philosophical literature concerning the role of  change as a seminal definitional 
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characteristic of  time. Barlassina and Del Prete (2015) discuss the following 
actual situation. Lance Armstrong won the Tour de France in the year 2000. 
Hence, the proposition expressed in (5) is true:
 
 (5)  Lance Armstrong won the Tour de France in 2000.
 
(from Barlassina & Del Prete, 2015, p. 61). But in 2012 it was discovered that 
Lance Armstrong had used illegal substances and his title of  winner was 
withdrawn. Barlassina and Del Prete assume that, after this event, (5) becomes 
false, even when it is uttered by the same speaker who, in addition, may not 
be aware of  the withdrawal of  the title. They say, “… in moving from Context 
A to Context B, the past (of  the actual world) has changed” (p. 61). When we 
think of  events as properties of  time (Montague, 1960), then the year 2000 
ceases to have the property of  winning the Tour de France by Armstrong.13 
In order to solve the problem they try to employ contextualism, on which 
winning the Tour de France is a context-sensitive predicate, or relationism, 
on which ‘winning the Tour de France’ is a relational predicate that relates 
a person and a predication in a context, concluding that neither will work 
because (6) would acquire a wrong analysis:
 
 (6)  It is no longer the case that Lance Armstrong won the Tour de France 
in 2000.
 
(from Barlassina & Del Prete, 2015, p. 65). They take it for granted that (6) is 
intuitively true when uttered in 2012 and that contextualism and relationalism 
both require that the meaning of (5) a s  embedded  in  (6 )  is tied, respectively 
in one way or the other, to the context relevant at the time of  uttering (6).
Now, if we follow them in accepting their first assumption, namely that (6) is 
intuitively true, then there is indeed a problem with implementing a contextualist 
or a relativist analysis, at least on their version of  the accounts. We would either 
have to resort to minimalism and the conclusion that the past has changed, or 
tweak the contextualist or relativist accounts in such a way that they are made to 
conform to the authors’ intuitions about (6). Another way out consists of denying 
the intuitive plausibility of  (6), for example by claiming that intuitively it is 
indeed the case that Lance Armstrong did win the Tour de France in 2000 but, 
say, that the event of winning and the property of being a winner have different 
characteristics: he won in 2000, tout court, but he was a winner in 2000 and is no 
longer a winner in 2012. We can easily tweak the linguistic descriptions and avoid 
a puzzle. If  (6) is false, we have the desired result.
But let us go along with the authors on the plausibility of  (6) and see how 
we can tweak a contextualist account to accommodate it. In order to accept 
the intuition that (6) is true, we would have to attend to its problematic 
[13]  Their analysis makes use of  the development of  Montague’s idea found in Partee (1973).
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structure. And since it is precisely the structure and the associated scoping 
that leads the authors to the formulation of  the alleged puzzle, unravelling 
the structure is likely to annihilate the puzzle itself. In order to agree with the 
speaker who truthfully utters (6) we would have to make it mean something 
to the effect of  (7), where p stands for (5).
 
 (7)  It is no longer the case that what was true in 2000, namely p, is true in 
2012.
 
(7) is equivalent to (8):
 
 (8)  It is no longer true that what was true in 2000, namely p, is true in 2012.
 
Then, (8) reanalyzes as (9):
 
 (9)  p was true in 2000 and p is no longer true in 2012.
 
In virtue of  the content of  (5), (9) reduces to (10):
 
 (10)  p and it is no longer true in 2012 that p.
 
It is apparent that the problem is strictly intra-theoretic and is triggered 
only on the account on which events are taken to be properties of  time. But 
this is a rather peculiar way of  posing the problem. It is true that Montague 
(1960) and following him Partee (1973) adopted the construct of  events as 
event types and as such properties of  time, but several decades later one 
would have to have a good independent reason to adopt this construal of  
events. As such one can present nothing more than an intra-theoretic puzzle 
constructed merely for its own sake. In the past several decades ample 
analyses and arguments put forward in formal semantics have demonstrated 
clear explanatory advantages of  construing events as particulars, to wit 
Davidson (1970), Higginbotham (1985), or Parsons (1990), followed by the 
formal treatment of  temporality in dynamic semantics such as Discourse 
Representation Theory (Kamp & Reyle, 1993).
If  we step outside Barlassina and Del Prete’s (2015) ‘puzzle for the puzzle’s 
sake’, what we have here is a fairly straightforward and unproblematic scoping: 
at t1(e) and at t2 (at t1(e)). It is straightforward because we can now, for example, 
plug in a speech-act-theoretic account and treat ‘at t1(e)’ and ‘at t2 (at t1(e))’ 
as assertions where truth of  an eventuality is relativized to times, resulting in 
‘at t1(at t1(e))’ and ‘at t2 (at t1(e))’, respectively. What was presented as a puzzle 
about the past now appears to be merely the fact that the structure of  natural-
language sentences is itself  to be analyzed in a contextualist manner since it 
is the context that allows pragmatic, syntactic, and lexical means of  expressing 
meaning to mix and to work together in producing utterance meaning.
Now, having rejected the intra-theoretic problem with contextualism with 
respect to the logical form of  (6) by pointing out the overwhelming preference 
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for a construal of  events as particulars in formal semantics, we can move full 
steam to the benefits of  a contextualist outlook. There is something intuitively 
appealing in saying that the past has changed: after all, (7)–(10) are all true, 
and if  so, then the past has  changed, although not in the sense in which 
Barlassina and Del Prete (2015) use this term. The past has changed because 
the contents of  the speech acts captured in ‘at t1(at t1(e))’ and ‘at t2 (at t1(e))’ 
are different. These contents are relativized to the perspective: either the 
perspectives of  different speakers, or, as was suggested above, even the same 
speaker, ignorant of  the revoking of  the title, on two different occasions. What 
appeared to be a puzzle now appears to be the standard state of  affairs calling 
for an equally standard contextualist analysis: speakers alter their view 
and alter their judgement, or the subject of  their judgement may change 
if  someone else fills a given role. In the latter case the puzzle becomes just 
another version of  the pseudo-puzzle associated with roles and reference 
exemplified in (11) and (12a)–(12b).
 
 (11)  The President of  the United States changes every four years.
 (12)  a. The President was assassinated in Dallas in 1963.
   vs.
   b. Barack Obama was assassinated in Dallas in 1963.
 
These are pseudo-puzzles indeed, and in addition well-mulled-over ones.
The intuitive folk conclusion is then this: the past has changed because 
the speaker’s perspective, attitude, knowledge of  the past, have changed, and 
these are essential for the representation of  the past. On the account developed 
here, past-time reference is built out of  attitudes to events that are in the 
epistemic sense remote from the self, and it is precisely the variation in this 
remoteness that changes.14 It seems that in languages such as Matses discussed 
in Section 2, where double tense would be used for the purpose of  (5) and (6), 
combining, say, distant past inferential and recent past experiential, the 
problem would not arise: the combinations of  tenses and evidential markers 
distinguish between different takes the speakers adopt on p, and result in 
appropriate semantic representations.
All in all, timeE and timeL are permeated with perspective. First, they are 
perspectival in the sense that the eventuality is portrayed from the vantage 
point of  the speaker, and as such it is presented as tensed experience, with 
different degree of  attention to different aspects of  the situation and, what 
will have particular importance for the next section, with different degrees of  
epistemic commitment. Next, they are inherently perspectival in the sense of  
temporal anaphora, namely that changing vantage point can alter the future to, 
[14]  See Section 4.1.
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say, future in the past, or the present into the future. This is well known from 
the need for distinguishing between event time, speaker time, and reference 
time proposed by Reichenbach (1948). It has to be remembered that the 
vantage point can change as discourse progresses, as is exemplified in (13):
 
 (13)  On Sunday I thought I would spend the day reading War and Peace. 
I was going to have coffee in bed and read. I started reading but then 
I remembered I had to go to a wedding and got up speedily.
 
Arguably, every instance of  a use of  grammatical tense reflects a perspective 
when the perspective is understood as a creation of  ‘deictic consciousness’ 
(see de Saussure, 2013, and his discussion of  origo) pertaining to (i.a) the 
speaker, or (i.b) shifted to somebody else, or sometimes (i.c) generalized 
to a greater or lesser extent (as in the case of, say, analytic truth on the one 
hand and physical laws on the other), and analogously to (ii.a) the speech 
time, or (ii.b) shifted away to the past or the future, or (ii.c) generalized 
over time.
This phenomenon is not unlike the phenomenon of  the reference shift 
in the case of  some indexicals such as I, you, here, or now discussed in the 
philosophical literature. According to Kaplan (1989), the semantic value of  
an indexical is fixed in the context of  the current speech act, except for its use 
in direct quotation. ‘Monster contexts’ are contexts that would violate this 
rule. But in the past few years, following Schlenker’s (2003) observation that 
Amharic allows for the displacement if  I, as in (14), linguists have engaged in 
a hunt for languages that allow for such ‘monsters’.15 In (14), ‘me’ refers to the 
speaker and ‘I’ refers to the speaker’s brother, and the shift of reference cannot 
be attributed to quotation: the Amharic sentence is not quotative. Instead, 
what we have is a narration from two different perspectives, where the choice 
depends on which perspective is chosen as more relevant and salient.
 
 (14)  wändәmme     käne gar       albälamm         alä
   my-brother    “with-me    I-will-not-eat”,    he said
   ‘My brother refused to eat with me.’
 
(from Leslau, 1995, p. 778). While this phenomenon has normally been 
analyzed as a case of  ‘context shift’, it seems more appropriate to describe 
it as the case of  focusing on the semantically prominent perspective. 
In the spirit of  Lewis’s (1979) centered worlds, Roberts (2014) uses for this 
purpose the concept of  ‘doxastic centers’, and Mount (2015, p. 20) ‘mutually-
accepted perspectives of  interlocutors’. It appears that such mutually 
[15]  See Roberts (2014), and on monster contexts, e.g., Predelli (2014) and Jaszczolt and 
Huang (in press).
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accepted perspectives also provide a theoretical solution to temporal reference: 
the vantage point, the degree of  epistemic commitment, the aspect of  the 
eventuality that the speaker chooses to bring to focus all testify to the fact 
that perspective and timeE are inherently interconnected. This will become 
important in the following section when we descend to the conceptual 
building blocks of  the concept of  time. We are now in a position to move 
to the properties of  timeE itself  and to address the question of  the complexity 
and universality of  the concept.
4.  TimeE as degrees of  acceptabili ty
4.1.  modal  supervenience  of  t ime
The explanation of time that I find plausible relies on answers to such questions 
as (i) whether temporality is a primitive concept or whether it can be broken 
down into more basic components, and, if  the latter, then (ii) what these 
components are. Guided by theoretical arguments and cross-linguistic evidence 
presented extensively elsewhere (Jaszczolt, 2009a, 2012, 2013, 2016b), according 
to the theory I propose the human concept of  time is inherently modal: on the 
level of  basic conceptual building blocks it reduces to epistemic modality. 
Likewise, the concepts of  the past, the present, and the future depend, in terms 
of their definitional characteristics, on the concepts of  human knowledge and 
degrees of  belief  associated with epistemic modality, where the latter is itself  a 
gradable concept, theoretically explicable as degrees of  commitment to the 
proposition that stands for the eventuality. In other words, temporality logically 
supervenes  on epistemic modality.16 Gradable modal concepts, externalized 
in natural languages in lexical, grammatical, and pragmatic means of expressing 
the degree of  epistemic commitment (or, equally, the degree of  epistemic 
detachment), form a continuum. Even if  we focus only on grammatical means 
of  expressing temporality in English, we can find the following clines. For the 
past, regular past (he went) or past of  narration (he goes) come with a relatively 
strong degree of  commitment, which then reduces with epistemic necessity 
past (he must have gone) and progressively with epistemic possibility past 
(he may/might have gone). Analogously, for the present, regular present, 
epistemic necessity present, and epistemic possibility present form a cline. 
To this we can add the interaction with aspect and with temporal and modal 
adverbials and information recovered from the context, in the spirit of  the 
[16]  “A set of  properties T supervenes on a set of  properties M iff things cannot differ with 
respect to properties T without also differing with respect to M properties: there cannot 
be a T-difference without an M-difference.” The definition is adapted from McLaughlin 
and Bennett (2005, p. 1). For the purpose at hand, I used ‘T’ for ‘temporal properties’ and 
‘M’ for ‘modal properties’.
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lexicon/grammar/pragmatics trade-offs discussed above, to form a fuller 
picture of  such clines with more finely grained distinctions.17
For the concept of  the future, this theory comes, so to speak, ‘for free’ 
if  one accepts that the human concept of  the future (futureE) is open and 
undetermined and as such essentially modal. But even if  one is commited to 
futureE as having essentially the same underlying characteristics as pastE and 
presentE, the theory of  modal building blocks stares one in the eye in virtue 
of  the sheer abundance, when viewed cross-linguistically, of  what on this view 
we would call dual-purpose grammatical forms (will, shall), that is, forms that 
can act as markers of  future tense or of  epistemic modality. The cline for 
future-time reference is then rich indeed; to wit, we start with strong 
commitment expressed with the so-called ‘tenseless future’ (He goes to London 
tomorrow), through the so-called futurate progressive (He is going to London 
tomorrow), both of  which additionally convey a notion of  a pre-planned 
activity, moving to periphrastic future (He is going to go to London tomorrow), 
through regular future, epistemic necessity future, and epistemic possibility 
future, analogous to the clines for the past and the present proposed above.
The idea of  conceptual building blocks is essentially the one adopted in 
neo-Whorfianism (Levinson, 2003), according to which lexical meanings 
often correspond to complex concepts called by Levinson (p. 300) ‘high-level 
molar concepts’ that are composed of ‘low-level concepts’. In neo-Whorfianism, 
cross-linguistic differences on the level of  complex lexical meanings are offset 
by the universality of  the conceptual atoms which they contain. For the 
purpose of  our theory of  the modal foundations of  temporality, this means 
that language-specific distinctions within the domain of  temporal reference, 
examples of  which I presented in Section 2, rest on an inventory of  universal 
epistemic modal concepts that stand for degrees of  commitment to the 
eventuality referred to in discourse. On the level of  thought, the differences 
either disappear or are easy to neutralize through the ‘unpacking’ of  these 
primitive concepts. Naturally, we cannot assume that all of  these modal 
conceptual building blocks will always have their lexical or grammatical 
counterparts;18 neither can we assume that the lexical or grammatical means 
of  expressing modality are always bi-uniquely correlated with primitive 
concepts. But there is sufficient evidence from the interrelation between 
temporal and modal expressions to suggest that what we can find underneath 
timeL is essentially epistemic modality.
[17]  We obtain a continuum because (i) lexically and grammatically conveyed detachment is 
not fixed but rather is influenced by contextual factors and (ii) context-specific pragmat-
ically recovered information forms one of  the three sources, viz. the lexicon/grammar/
pragmatics trade-offs.
[18]  Note this difference between these primitives and Wierzbicka’s (e.g., 1996) semantic 
primes.
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In a nutshell, linguistic evidence for the modal conceptual underpinnings 
of  temporality, that is evidence from timeL for timeE, comes from the facts 
that referring to the temporal location allows for such tense/modality clines 
representing degrees of  commitment; that relevant forms double up as 
temporal and modal markers; as well as from the fact that tense, aspect, and 
evidentiality seem to rely on the same conceptual primitives.19 Supporting 
arguments from the quantitative essence of  modality and from timeM for this 
degree semantics are discussed in Sections 4.2 and 5, respectively.
4.2.  the  d irect-quantitat ive  v ie w
There is a question that remains to be addressed in order to complete this 
view of  modal supervenience of  time. Since we find degrees of  commitment 
in the domains of  all three types of  temporal location – the past, the present, 
and the future – then the degrees of  commitment will not help us explain 
the fact that we experience the past as fixed, the present as most vivid, and the 
future as uncertain. In other words, the degrees of  commitment should also 
reflect the fact that we are most certain of  the factual status of  what we 
experience here and now, fairly certain of  what we did experience in the past 
and have retained in memories, and relatively uncertain of  what the future 
will bring. In other words again, the cline of  commitment does not go from 
the past through the present and to the future, analogous to the arrow of  
psychological time (timeE); we cannot transpose this arrow of  time onto some 
analogous but more finely grained arrow with degrees of  modality marked 
on it. So, it appears that if  we accept the theory of  modal supervenience, we 
must either deny that there is any essential qualitative difference between the 
futureE, the presentE, and the pastE (they are all modal and they all allow for 
degrees), or we have to dig a little deeper into (a) the properties of  their 
modal building blocks on the one hand, and (b) the exact nature of  the relation 
between these building blocks and the resulting complex temporal concepts 
on the other. The answer could in principle be found along either of  these 
routes.
The most pressing question here is that of  explaining the experienced 
asymmetry between the future and the past. Now, if  we pursue path (a), 
we can venture a hypothesis that the differences between the three temporal 
locations, and a fortiori the asymmetry between the future and the past, 
are underlyingly quantitative, and as such can be found in the properties 
of the conceptual atoms. This is what I call the Direct-Quantitative View (DQ). 
[19]  See, e.g., Aikhenvald (2012) on the languages of  the Amazon, Steedman (1997) on Hopi, 
and Section 2 above.
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On the other hand, if  we opt for a search for a solution along path (b), we can 
retain the intuitive view that the differences between the three temporal 
orientations are qualitative. But we can only do so with the proviso that the 
mapping between quantitative distinctions on the level of  (modal) conceptual 
atoms and the qualitative distinctions on the level of  (temporal) conceptual 
complexes has to be explained by some form of  systematic, formally traceable 
(and as such compositional on the level of  conceptual structures) construction 
of  meaning. This option I call the Modal-Contextualist View (MC; Jaszczolt, 
2013, 2016a).
Let us begin with DQ. This is how one might proceed. Let us assume 
for this purpose the intuitive stance of  eternalism, according to which, by 
definition, all times are equally real. We have seen that timeE results in tenseE 
conceptualized as pastE, presentE, and futureE, in that humans think of  time 
in terms of  memories, experiences, and anticipations. Hence, eternalism is 
an intuitively plausible stance to adopt. Next, we borrow the observation 
advanced in the philosophical literature that eternalism is analogous to 
possibilism: in other words, assuming the reality of  the three temporal 
orientations is analogous to assuming the reality of possible worlds (cf. Noonan, 
2013). Now, as we know from the history of  possible-worlds semantics, 
possibilism can be weakened to a form on which possible worlds are not 
endowed with metaphysical reality but merely with reality pertaining to 
useful theoretical constructs. This we will call ‘linguistic possibilism’. 
Another way to look at linguistic possibilism is then to acknowledge that 
such possible worlds are reflected in linguistic expressions of  possibility – and, 
as we have discussed above, these come in different degrees of  detachment 
and allow for a cline. Next, in terms of  Lewis (1979), there are centered 
possible worlds that allow for representing the de se perspective. Or, more 
recently, in terms of  Roberts (2014), there are doxastic centres.20 My modal 
theory of  temporality fits well in this picture in that degrees of  modal 
detachment correspond to such degrees of  detachment from the doxastic 
centre. Such clines of  relevant modal expressions point to what we call 
linguistic degree possibilism. Now, on the level of  complex concepts, 
linguistic degree possibilism corresponds to linguistic degree eternalism: 
degrees of  epistemic modal commitment are parallel to the degrees of  
commitment to a temporally located eventuality as assessed from a doxastic 
centre (de se perspective).
In the previous version of  this argument (Jaszczolt, 2016b) I did not attend 
to the de se perspective. I also used a short-cut which I now think ought to be 
avoided. In order to proceed further in the defence of DQ, I made the following 
[20]  After Quine. See also the discussion in Stalnaker (1981).
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assumption. I adopted a version of  descriptive metaphysics (Strawson, 1959): 
the assumption that properties of  reality (ontological distinctions) can be 
accessed through the analysis of  the ways of  speaking about them. Then, in 
terms of  my contextualist ideology, this would mean that metaphysics can be 
read of  lexical, grammatical, and pragmatic means of  speaking about reality 
(which I call pragmatic i sed  descr ipt ive  me taphys ics ). In terms 
of  the current discussion, this would be a view that the ways we speak about 
reality reveal the concepts we form of  reality, which in turn reveal properties 
of  reality itself  (viz. timeL illuminating timeE illuminating timeM). This 
allowed me to propose that once we have provided an argument for the 
degree-based analysis of  timeL, we can proceed to the degree-based timeM 
in that the degree-based linguistic expression of  psychological time (timeE) 
takes us straight to the degree-based reality of  time and as such to DQ. And 
this would conclude the proof: timeM is graded just as timeL is graded.
This argument uses some intuitively as well as theoretically plausible 
assumptions. In addition, since it ends up with quantitative differences 
between temporal orientations, it is compatible with B-theory for ‘real time’ 
(timeM) and as such with the special theory of  relativity. But this is not the 
path we will take in the current analysis. We have accepted that timeE can be 
read off timeL with the proviso that the latter is understood in terms of  the 
lexicon/grammar/pragmatics trade-offs. But with respect to timeE and 
timeM, we will reverse the direction of  analysis and assume that it is timeM 
as understood by modern physics that has to be the starting point, precisely 
in order to see whether timeE reflects its properties.
To repeat, at this point of  our argument we have to address the question: 
Is there a path from degree possibilism to degree eternalism, where the latter 
(by our initial assumption) would allow us to assume gradability of  time 
reference as it is proposed in DQ? A simple solution would be to say that 
one of  the contributing factors for grading possibilities is their time: events 
remote in time are more likely to be poorly remembered or forgotten, events 
planned for the remote future can be planned with a higher degree of  
vagueness and lower predictability, and so forth. Although this temporal factor 
in the acceptability of  events will interact with other factors, it is a factor 
nevertheless and is clearly graded. If  so, then we end up with the same 
conclusion: degree-based temporal reference (for the purpose of  our argument 
portrayed here as degree eternalism) can be read off degree-possibilism and 
DQ is upheld without invoking the properties of  timeM.
But having now reversed the explanans and the explanandum and settled 
for proceeding from timeM to timeE, analogous to the common practice of  
proceeding from timeL to timeE, we can do more than merely replace one step 
in our argument with a new independent one. We can also actively use this 
reversal in order to see how far it takes us. While any detailed scientific discussion 
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of  timeM lies beyond the remits of  this paper and beyond the expertise of  its 
author, the topic is touched upon in Section 5, where we discuss the meaning 
of  modality vis-à-vis the timeL/timeE/timeM distinction.
The next step is to ask whether DQ and MC enjoy equal theoretical status. 
If  we discover that there is a possibility of  reducing one to the other through 
logical argumentation, then we obtain our desired result: one, well-justified 
theory of temporal reference in language and in thought. To repeat, the putative 
MC relegates to the composition of  meaning in context the entire task of  the 
mapping of  the quantitative differences (in modality) on the level of  conceptual 
atoms onto the qualitative (temporal) differences on the level of  conceptual 
complexes. This would have to mean that while we think in terms of qualitatively 
different concepts of the past, the present, and the future, these are underlyingly 
just degrees of modality that information from the situation to which temporal 
reference is indexed converts, so to speak, into such concepts. How this influence 
of  contextual information executes this categorization remains relegated to a 
mysterious ‘magic box’. We could possibly use the move we employed in the 
revised argument for DQ that took us away from descriptive metaphysics and 
argue that timeM provides the foundation for timeE. In particular, the direction 
of timeM, notably the entropy of the closed system, paralleled by the direction of  
timeE, notably the fact that what is anticipated becomes experienced and then is 
retained as remembered (that is, that the future becomes the present and then the 
past), point towards the lack of symmetry between the past and the future: time 
is equally asymmetrical on the metaphysical and the epistemic level. However, 
the asymmetry does not yet mean that we ought to accept MC. It merely means 
that in DQ it is the value associated with the degrees that will surface on the level 
of  complex concepts as the values ‘past’, ‘present’, or ‘future’ (as well as various 
conceptual subcategorizations thereof, evidence of  which we found in natural 
languages and exemplified in Section 2). Looked at from this perspective, MC 
appears to be easily reducible to DQ: just as in MC we have to invoke some 
pragmatics-rich composition of meaning to perform the ‘magic box’ classification 
of what looks quantitative on the level of conceptual atoms into three different 
qualities, so, in DQ, we have to invoke the lexicon, grammar, and the context to 
specify the value of the index on the quality of the commitment. In other words, 
in DQ, it is the lexicon, grammar, or pragmatics that provide the value which 
corresponds to the qualities. In the following section I show how my modal theory 
achieves this for the purpose of  semantic representation of  temporal reference.
4.3.  representation of temporal reference
In order to formally represent temporal reference performed through the 
employment of lexical, grammatical, or pragmatic means, I employ an adapted 
version of  a sentential operator of  Acceptability proposed by Grice (2001), 
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who used it in his unfinished attempt to subsume different kinds of  modality 
under one concept and offer to them a uniform semantic analysis. In the 
version adopted in my theory of  Default Semantics (DS), it is an operator on 
so-called merger representations: proposition-like constructs that have the 
status of  mental representations. Merger representations are representations 
of  the meaning of  the main, intended primary speech act of  a Model Speaker 
as recovered by the Model Addressee.21 Since this primary meaning can be 
conveyed directly or indirectly, merger representations are not restricted by 
the logical form of  the uttered sentence but instead build on information 
provided by various linguistic and non-linguistic sources of  meaning 
identified in the theory – information that is processed through the interaction 
of  various types of  processes identified in the theory. Meaning so understood 
often goes beyond the meaning conveyed by the sentence but, unlike on less 
radical contextualist accounts, it is not restricted to the development or 
modification of  its logical form: in some contexts it overrides it. Merger 
representations thus have the status of  semantic representations that enjoy 
psychological reality. Such merger representations qua conceptual structures 
are compositional by methodological assumption, but compositionality is not 
predicated here of linguistic structures or even of modified (developed, enriched, 
modulated, and so forth) linguistic structures, but rather of conceptual entities. 
Temporality is accounted for by means of  an acceptability operator on these 
structures. My modified acceptability operator is indexed for the degree of  
commitment to the situation captured by the merger representation. This 
degree is reflected in the subscript Δ, annotated for the value that comes from 
the grammatical, lexical, or pragmatic indicators of  time – as in the DQ 
solution summarized above. All in all, this gives us the representation such as 
ACCΔrp ├ Σ that reads ‘it is acceptable to the degree pertaining to the regular 
past that it is the case that Σ’, where Σ stands for a merger representation.
Where tense and temporality coincide, DS adopts the referential analysis of  
tense used in DS’s mother theory, DRT (Kamp & Reyle, 1993, after Partee, 
1973). But since the objective of  DRT is to represent sentences in discourse 
(albeit accounting for pragmatic presupposition and other pragmatics-driven 
information), while DS models speech acts, DRT relies on grammatical 
tense to a much greater extent than DS, which shifts the assumption of  
compositionality to the level of  conceptual structures. Since DS represents 
temporality on the level of  the conceptual qua semantic structure where time is 
tensed, it appears to be compatible, on the level of  information, with the 
[21]  Default Semantics models discourse meaning that is processed according to rules of  
conversational interaction and as such does not account for cases of  miscommunication 
caused by a faulty assumption or faulty recognition of  intention pertaining to one or 
more of  the sources of  information. See Jaszczolt (2005, 2010, 2016a).
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CD stands for cognitive default: the process that attends to the information 
coming from the strength of  intentionality of  the mental state corresponding 
to the utterance, translated as the level of  informativeness associated with the 
construct. For example, a definite description has, in virtue of  CD alone, 
a referential interpretation (here: David Cameron), unless other sources and 
processes intervene. WS stands for ‘word meaning and sentence structure’, 
that is, information coming from the linguistic construct, and CPIpm for 
Gricean inference – called here conscious pragmatic inference indexed for 
primary meaning.22 It is CPIpm that overrides the default present-time 
reference of  the present tense in this context.
operator analysis of  time (Prior, 1967): our acceptability operator on merger 
representation indexed for tenseE (which may but need not coincide with 
tenseL) has obvious conceptual parallels with Prior’s sentential operators for 
the past and the future. It presents the outcome of the processing of temporality 
to be recovered from different aspects of  the situation of  discourse, and as such 
belongs to the surface, molecular level where time, rather than its conceptual 
modal epistemic building blocks, emerges as a complex concept.
Figure 1 contains a merger representation for the sentence The Prime 
Minister resigns in the context as in (15), selected in order to demonstrate 
how the DS-theoretic analysis caters for tense–time mismatches. As in DRT, 
on whose language the language of  DS is modelled, the first row contains 
discourse referents and the subsequent rows discourse conditions. In DS, 
square brackets contain the material on which the type of  process indicated 
by the index that follows the bracket operates.
 
 (15)  This is what happened last week. People go to the polls. The results of  
the referendum are announced. The Prime Minister resigns. …
 
Fig. 1. Σ for ‘The Prime Minister resigns’ as uttered in the context of  (15).
[22]  Note that in DS, the primary/secondary meaning distinction cuts across the explicit/ 
implicit distinction in that primary meaning can be conveyed indirectly. CPI can thus be 
active in deriving primary (CPIpm) as well as secondary meanings (CPIsm). On arguments 
for this construal see Jaszczolt (2009b).
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To sum up, in this section I have presented the core characteristics of  the 
DS-theoretic approach to representing timeE as expressed through timeL. 
They consist of  the theory of  temporality as supervenient on epistemic 
modality, leading to the assumption of  the universality of  the conceptual 
modal building blocks, the DQ view of  the relation between the building 
blocks and the complex temporal concepts, and the semantic representation of  
temporal reference using an acceptability operator on merger representations 
indexed for degrees and annotated with a value coming from the lexicon/
grammar/pragmatic consortium. I exemplified this radically contextualist 
semantic analysis with an utterance that displays a tense–time mismatch 
where reference to different types of  processes that cooperate in producing 
a merger representation accounts for this mismatch. What remains is to 
address the question of  this modal supervenience vis-à-vis the M, E, and 
L levels on which time has been discussed here and for which a degree-
based theory was defended.
5.  L,  E,  M, and detachment
In Section 4.2 we made a methodological decision to reject descriptive 
metaphysics and instead treat (i) expressing temporal reference in natural 
language (timeL) and real time as understood in mathematical models of  
spacetime (timeM) as sources of  independent evidence for the concept of  time 
(timeE). The rationale behind this assumption is that there is substantial 
evidence that the way we speak about an aspect of  reality is strongly correlated 
with the concepts that speakers of  a language form – to wit extensive 
research on the surface relativity (i.e., relativity in the neo-Whorfian sense 
adopted in Section 3) in the conceptualization of  space.23 We have seen that 
the degrees of  epistemic detachment can be read off linguistic expressions 
as they are externalized there through the lexicon, grammar, or context-
driven pragmatic inference and defaults. But what is the ultimate cause of  
this modality? Is it merely the egocentric perspective on temporality imposed 
by the observer? Or is there an equivalent in timeM with which time can 
be correlated? A simple but negative answer would be to follow the terms 
of  the A-/B-theoretic construal and maintain, as we did in Section 2, that 
reality itself  is B-theoretic while the concept of  time is tensed, tout court. 
But this is not the whole answer.
In order to attempt a fuller answer, we ought to ask first whether timeM 
is perspectival and as such indexical in any relevant sense of  these labels. 
[23]  See, e.g., Pederson, Danziger, Wilkins, Levinson, Kita, and Senft (1998); Levinson 
(2003); Levinson, Meira, and The Language and Cognition Group (2003); Levinson and 
Burenhult (2009).
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Can the perspectivity and indexicality of  timeL and timeE be reconciled 
with the characteristics of  timeM?
First, we have to remember that perspectivity affects not merely complex 
temporal concepts but their modal building blocks as well. Just as time 
is egocentric and indexical, so is the degree of  commitment to the truth of  
a given proposition about an eventuality. The fact that the property of  
perspectivity is preserved all the way down allows us to shift the discussion 
of  the correlation between the E and the M domains to the level of  modal 
building blocks because the relevant properties are not lost: modal supervenience 
of time guarantees by definition that both detachment and egocentric perspective 
belong to the definitional characteristics of timeE.
Now we are in a position to ask about the correlates of  graded detachment 
and perspectivity within the domain of  timeM. In the most general terms, the 
correlate of  epistemic modality is metaphysical modality: propositions are 
known or believed just as eventualities must or can happen. The correlate 
of  the gradation of  epistemic possibility would then be the gradation of  
metaphysical possibility. The latter obeys certain physical laws such as the 
law of  increasing entropy predicted by the second law of  thermodynamics. 
It is also restricted by mathematical models of  spacetime where time cannot be 
explained by a fixed ordering of  its units: simultaneity, for example, is on this 
model relative; events that appear simultaneous from one perspective may 
appear not synchronized when we vary the movement of  the observer.24 
In this general sense, timeM is modal, and it is also perspectival in the sense 
of  fitting within the constraints of  a mathematical model of  spacetime.
The next question to ask is whether the degree-based epistemology is 
compatible with a degree-based metaphysics. There is no tenseM and no 
passage of  timeM (Mellor, 1998; Le Poidevin, 2007). In order to answer this 
question one would have to stipulate what the M correlate of  such degrees 
ought to mean. To follow this up would require a different kind of  enquiry 
and very different expertise, but suffice it to say that the cosmological ‘arrow 
of  time’ is a quantifiable concept: the universe expands and expansion can be 
measured and explained in mathematical terms.
This construal leaves us with two kinds of  reductionism. First, in DS, 
we have performed conceptual reductionism where we reduced semantics 
to epistemology in awarding semantic status to mental representations.25 
[24]  See Einstein’s (1920/2010, pp. 25–27) thought experiment summarized in ftn 5.
[25]  Conceptual reductionism means an analysis of  propositions in order to establish which 
ones “could serve as epistemic warrant” (Sklar, 1981, p. 126). Then, as Sklar points out, 
naturalistic reductionism draws on conceptual reductionism: “… much of  the transition 
from space and time to relativistic spacetime proceeds by just such an epistemically 
motivated ‘reductionist’ critique”.
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Now we have the option of  saying that the concept of  time and the reality 
of  time are interconnected in such a way that timeE, with its egocentric, 
perspectival degrees, maps onto timeM with its degrees assigned by the 
physics of  spacetime. Perspectivity can be written into the L and the M levels 
without disturbing the correlation: on the E level it comes from the egocentric 
construal of  time, and on the M level from the models of  spacetime. And 
where we have the correlation, we can look for further reduction to the level 
of  properties of  reality. But while we can be fairly certain that the correlation 
between concepts and their linguistic expression (timeE and timeL) has 
the same source, to complete the reductionism we would have to say that 
the source of  this conceptualization is the reality itself: the human concept 
of  time is what it is because real time is what it is. By rejecting descriptive 
metaphysics we opened up this issue for discussion. But by focusing on 
egocentric perspectivity we pointed out that the issue is not so simple: 
memories, experiences, anticipations, and the strength of  commitment are 
likely to have their sources both in reality and in the temporally finite human 
ego. Phenomenologists emphasized the latter but less has been done in 
philosophy of  time by way of  a search for correlations between the egocentric 
perspective and the cosmological perspective. The latter is worthy of  more 
attention because finiteness of  the human life and human mental architecture 
are, after all, part of  a bigger picture. The theory of  temporality as modality 
presented here may have its roots at a deeper level than the well-researched 
timeL/timeE interface would suggest. But, while flagging the possibility of  
reductionism, we are far from having a theory of  this kind of  supervenience.
6.  Conclusion:  in search for  the inalienable essence of  
t ime
In human life, time passes; humans have a vivid, useful, and productive 
concept of  passing time. I put forward a view that this concept of  time is not 
primitive but rather is composed of  simple, atomic concepts that reflect 
knowledge and beliefs – degrees of  epistemic modality. I have also argued 
that this degree-based view is compatible with the metaphysics of  time on 
which there is no time passage. If  we pursue neo-Whorfianism about time 
further, we have to admit that the modal building blocks of  the temporal 
concepts are either salient or can be brought to salience. Does it mean that the 
inalienable essence of  the concept of  time is the detachment from certainty? 
In the domain of  the representat ion  of  time, the degree-based modal 
concepts do indeed constitute the inalienable essence. However, by virtue of  
the optional surfacing in consciousness, they cannot be assigned this status in 
the domain of  the exper ience  of  time. But they are fairly robust there, as 
we can glean from the clines of  commitment, lexicalized or grammaticalized 
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in language, with which we talk about not only future but also past and 
present events. They are also robust when we consider that the experience of  
duration is subjective and varies with emotions and evaluation of  events 
among other factors; that we have the aptitude to juggle different timelines 
associated with different roles we play in life; and add to it the synthetic 
rather than analytic view that humans have of  their lives: we are not able to 
partition life into objectively delineated events, nor are we able to say where 
the present moment begins or ends – to wit the important role that has to be 
assigned to the concept of  the specious present. Next, it also appears that 
some form of  modality permeates all three relevant levels: L, E, as well as M. 
The overall tentative conclusion then has to be that basic epistemic modal 
concepts together with the de se perspective allow us to represent reality as 
if  it was tensedM, but only so because timeM of  spacetime models is itself  
intrinsically metaphysically modal.
I will conclude with a quotation from a great historical novel, War and 
Peace. In his analysis of  causes and effects of  the Napoleonic wars, Leo 
Tolstoy observes that one method of  analyzing historical change
“… consists in taking an arbitrary series of  continuous events and 
examining it separately from others, whereas there is not and cannot be 
a beginning to any event, but one event always continuously follows 
another.” (Tolstoy, 1869/2007, p. 822)
This leads historians to investigate smaller and smaller units in striving for truth. 
But, he continues, varying the size of the event comes with varying the perspective 
from which it is observed; the degree to which perspective permeates the account 
is inversely proportional to the generalization over individuals, until we reach the 
entirely egocentric perspective on events. The fact that we can opt for more finely 
grained or more coarsely grained perspectives means that the perspectives and 
the fineness of  grain are, as Tolstoy emphasizes, arbitrary. It also means that 
what we see as a causal link can in fact only be superimposed when this arbitrary 
partitioning into events is already decided upon. In reality, we are “in the middle 
of  a shifting series of  events” where “[i]mperceptibly, moment by moment, 
an event is carved into its meaning” (p. 825).
Leaving aside debates over the adequacy of  different visions of  history, 
what matters for us here is the importance of  the perspective from which 
temporality is predicated: this perspective appears to be invariably dynamic 
and arbitrarily varying with respect to the unit of  time, and (as it appears) 
a fortiori varying on the scale from the individual to the collective. In short, 
time and perspective, where the latter manifests itself  in the construction of  
units and the assignment of  properties and attitudes to them as captured 
by our ACCΔn ├ Σ, are intrinsically linked on the level of  linguistic and 
conceptual structure – and so, arguably, on the DS-theoretic account adopted 
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here, on the level of  semantic qua conceptual structure, all without any 
adverse effect on what we would have to take metaphysical time itself  to be. 
Epistemic modal building blocks appear to be an adequate and justified way 
to understand both this complex concept and what it stands for.
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